Three-types models of multidimensional screening
AbstractThis paper analyzes the variety of optimal screening contracts in a relatively simple multidimensional framework a` la Armstrong and Rochet (1999), when only three types of agents are present. It is shown, among other things, that the well known principle in optimal contract theory of `no distortion at the top' does not carry over to the multidimensional case
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Modena and Reggio E., Faculty of Economics "Marco Biagi" in its series Department of Economics with number 0507.
Length: pages 24
Date of creation: Oct 2005
Date of revision:
Asymmmetric information; multidimensional screening; optimal contract;
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