This paper analyzes the variety of optimal screening contracts in a relatively simple multidimensional framework a` la Armstrong and Rochet (1999), when only three types of agents are present. It is shown, among other things, that the well known principle in optimal contract theory of `no distortion at the top' does not carry over to the multidimensional case
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Paper provided by University of Modena and Reggio E., Faculty of Economics "Marco Biagi" in its series Department of Economics with number
0507.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D58 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation