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Internal versus external growth in industries with scale economies: A computational model of optimal merger policy

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  • Mermelstein, Ben
  • Nocke, Volker
  • Satterthwaite, Mark A.
  • Whinston, Michael D.

Abstract

We study optimal merger policy in a dynamic model in which the presence of scale economies implies that firms can reduce costs through either internal investment in build- ing capital or through mergers. The model, which we solve computationally, allows firms to invest or propose mergers according to the relative profitability of these strategies. An antitrust authority is able to block mergers at some cost. We examine the optimal policy when the antitrust authority can commit to a policy rule and when it cannot commit, and consider both consumer value and aggregate value as possible objectives of the antitrust authority. We find that optimal policy can differ substantially from what would be best considering only welfare in the period the merger is proposed. We also find that the abil- ity to commit can lead to a significant welfare improvement. In general, antitrust policy can greatly affect firms` optimal investment behavior, and firms` investment behavior can in turn greatly affect the antitrust authority`s optimal policy.

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  • Mermelstein, Ben & Nocke, Volker & Satterthwaite, Mark A. & Whinston, Michael D., 2014. "Internal versus external growth in industries with scale economies: A computational model of optimal merger policy," Working Papers 14-10, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:mnh:wpaper:35958
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    Cited by:

    1. Gilbert, Richard J. & Katz, Michael L., 2022. "Dynamic merger policy and pre-merger product choice by an entrant," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    2. Xavier Boutin, 2015. "Mergers and the Dynamics of Innovation," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2015-15, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    3. Brett Hollenbeck, 2020. "Horizontal mergers and innovation in concentrated industries," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 1-37, March.
    4. John Asker & Chaim Fershtman & Jihye Jeon & Ariel Pakes, 2016. "The Competitive Effects of Information Sharing," NBER Working Papers 22836, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. David Besanko & Ulrich Doraszelski & Yaroslav Kryukov, 2017. "How Efficient is Dynamic Competition? The Case of Price as Investment," NBER Working Papers 23829, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Przemysław Jeziorski, 2023. "Empirical Model of Dynamic Merger Enforcement—Choosing Ownership Caps in U.S. Radio," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(8), pages 4457-4480, August.
    7. Pakes, Ariel, 2017. "Empirical tools and competition analysis: Past progress and current problems," Scholarly Articles 34710163, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    8. Nocke, Volker & Schutz, Nicolas, 2018. "An Aggregative Games Approach to Merger Analysis in Multiproduct-Firm Oligopoly," CEPR Discussion Papers 12905, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Eileen Fumagalli & Tore Nilssen, 2019. "Sweetening the Pill: a Theory of Waiting to Merge," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 351-388, September.
    10. Kaplow, Louis, 2021. "Horizontal merger analysis," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    11. John Asker & Chaim Fershtman & Jihye Jeon & Ariel Pakes, 2020. "A computational framework for analyzing dynamic auctions: The market impact of information sharing," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(3), pages 805-839, September.
    12. Ulrich Doraszelski & Kenneth L. Judd, 2019. "Dynamic stochastic games with random moves," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 59-79, March.
    13. Robert Clark & Mario Samano, 2022. "Incentivized Mergers and Cost Efficiency: Evidence from the Electricity Distribution Industry," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(4), pages 791-837, December.
    14. Calvano, Emilio & Polo, Michele, 2021. "Market power, competition and innovation in digital markets: A survey," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    15. Doraszelski, Ulrich & Besanko, David & Kryukov, Yaroslav, 2017. "How Efficient is Dynamic Competition? The Case of Price as Investment," CEPR Discussion Papers 12279, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Igor Letina & Armin Schmutzler & Regina Seibel, 2020. "Killer acquisitions and beyond: policy effects on innovation strategies," ECON - Working Papers 358, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Jul 2023.
    17. Cavenaile, Laurent & Celik, Murat Alp & Tian, Xu, 2021. "The Dynamic Effects of Antitrust Policy on Growth and Welfare," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 42-59.
    18. Giulio Federico & Fiona Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, 2019. "Antitrust and Innovation: Welcoming and Protecting Disruption," NBER Chapters, in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 20, pages 125-190, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Haucap, Justus & Stiebale, Joel, 2023. "Non-price effects of mergers and acquisitions," DICE Discussion Papers 402, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    20. Neba Bhalla & Inderjit Kaur & Rakesh Kumar Sharma, 2022. "Examining the Effect of Tax Reform Determinants, Firms’ Characteristics and Demographic Factors on the Financial Performance of Small and Micro Enterprises," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(14), pages 1-18, July.
    21. FUKASAWA Takeshi & OHASHI Hiroshi, 2023. "Long-run Effect of a Horizontal Merger and Its Remedial Standards," Discussion papers 23001, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    22. Chen, J. & Elliott, M. & Koh, A., 2020. "Capability Accumulation and Conglomeratization in the Information Age," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2069, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Merger Policy ; Antitrust ; Investment ; Entry ; Commitment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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