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Ambiguity and public good provision in large societies

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  • Bailey, Ralph W.
  • Eichberger, Jürgen
  • Kelsey, David

Abstract

In this paper we consider the effect of ambiguity on the private provision of public goods. Equilibrium is shown to exist and be unique. We examine how provision of the public good changes as the size of the population increases. We show that when there is uncertainty there may be less free-riding in large societies.

Suggested Citation

  • Bailey, Ralph W. & Eichberger, Jürgen & Kelsey, David, 2004. "Ambiguity and public good provision in large societies," Papers 04-54, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    • Handle: RePEc:mnh:spaper:2689
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    Cited by:

    1. le Roux, Sara, 2020. "Climate change catastrophes and insuring decisions: A study in the presence of ambiguity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 992-1002.
    2. Simona Fabrizi & Steffen Lippert & Addison Pan & Matthew Ryan, 2022. "A theory of unanimous jury voting with an ambiguous likelihood," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 399-425, October.
    3. Matteo M. Marini & Aurora García-Gallego & Luca Corazzini, 2018. "Communication in a threshold public goods game with ambiguity: Anomalies and regularities," Working Papers 2018/03, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
    4. Astrid Dannenberg & Andreas L�schel & Gabriele Paolacci & Christiane Reif & Alessandro Tavoni, 2011. "Coordination under threshold uncertainty in a public goods game," GRI Working Papers 64, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
    5. David Kelsey & Sara Le Roux, 2017. "Dragon Slaying with Ambiguity: Theory and Experiments," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 19(1), pages 178-197, February.
    6. Stauber, Ronald, 2019. "A strategic product for belief functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 38-64.
    7. Kishishita, Daiki & Ozaki, Hiroyuki, 2020. "Public goods game with ambiguous threshold," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    8. Ronald Stauber, 2019. "A strategic product for belief functions," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2019-668, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
    9. Kocherlakota, Narayana R. & Song, Yangwei, 2019. "Public goods with ambiguity in large economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 218-246.
    10. Guha, Brishti, 2022. "Ambiguity aversion, group size, and deliberation: Costly information and decision accuracy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 201(C), pages 115-133.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ambiguity ; public goods ; Choquet expected utility;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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