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Do Attitudes Towards Corruption Differ Across Cultures? Experimental Evidence from Australia, India, Indonesia andSingapore

Author

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  • L. Cameron
  • A. Chaudhuri
  • N. Erkal
  • L. Gangadharan

Abstract

This paper examines cultural differences in attitudes towards corruption by analysing individual-decision making in a corrupt experimental environment. Attitudes towards corruption play a critical role in the persistence of corruption. Our experiments differentiate between the incentives to engage in corrupt behaviour and the incentives to punish corrupt behaviour and allow us to explore whether, in environments characterized by lower levels of corruption, there is both a lower propensity to engage in corrupt behaviour and a higher propensity to punish corrupt behaviour. Based on experiments run in Australia (Melbourne), India (Delhi), Indonesia (Jakarta) and Singapore, we find that there is more variation in the propensities to punish corrupt behaviour than in the propensities to engage in corrupt behaviour across cultures. The results reveal that the subjects in India exhibit a higher tolerance towards corruption than the subjects in Australia while the subjects in Indonesia behave similarly to those in Australia. The subjects in Singapore have a higher propensity to engage in corruption than the subjects in Australia. We also vary our experimental design to examine the impact of a more effective punishment system and the effect of the perceived cost of bribery.

Suggested Citation

  • L. Cameron & A. Chaudhuri & N. Erkal & L. Gangadharan, 2005. "Do Attitudes Towards Corruption Differ Across Cultures? Experimental Evidence from Australia, India, Indonesia andSingapore," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 943, The University of Melbourne.
  • Handle: RePEc:mlb:wpaper:943
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Elizabeth Asiedu & James Freeman, 2009. "The Effect of Corruption on Investment Growth: Evidence from Firms in Latin America, Sub‐Saharan Africa, and Transition Countries," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(2), pages 200-214, May.
    2. Mohamed Lamine MBENGUE, 2013. "Does Corruption Increase the risk Premium on the West African Economic Monetary Union (WAEMU) Bond Market?," Information Management and Business Review, AMH International, vol. 5(3), pages 129-135.
    3. Abigail Barr & Magnus Lindelow & Pieter Serneels, 2005. "Intrinsic motivations on the development frontline: Do they exist? Do they endure?," Economics Series Working Papers GPRG-WPS-033, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    4. Anttiroiko, Ari-Veikko, 2014. "Good governance in context: Learning from anti-corruption policies of Finland and Singapore," MPRA Paper 67807, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Oct 2015.
    5. Vivi Alatas & Lisa Cameron & Ananish Chaudhuri & Nisvan Erkal & Lata Gangadharan, 2009. "Gender, Culture, and Corruption: Insights from an Experimental Analysis," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 75(3), pages 663-680, January.
    6. Abigail Barr & Danila Serra, 2006. "Culture and Corruption," Economics Series Working Papers GPRG-WPS-040, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    7. Alexander Tatarko & Anna Mironova, 2016. "Values and Attitudes Towards Corruption: À Cross-Cultural Study in Four European Countries," HSE Working papers WP BRP 61/PSY/2016, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    8. Abigail Barr & Danila Serra, 2009. "The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 12(4), pages 488-503, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; Experiments; Punishment; Cultural Analysis;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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