Models With Two Or More Public Goods
AbstractWe extend the simple model of voluntary public good provision to allow for two or more public goods, and explore the new possibilities that arise in this setting. We show that, when there are many public goods, voluntary contribution equilibrium typically generates, not only too low a level of public good provision, but also the wrong mix of public goods. We also analyse the neutrality property in the more general setting, and extend a neutrality proposition of Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986). The first author would like to thank Professor Peter Bardsley and the Economic Theory Centre, University of Melbourne, for providing a very congenial period as a visitor, during which this paper was completed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The University of Melbourne in its series Department of Economics - Working Papers Series with number 896.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
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Postal: Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne, 5th Floor, Economics and Commerce Building, Victoria, 3010, Australia
Phone: +61 3 8344 5289
Fax: +61 3 8344 6899
Web page: http://www.economics.unimelb.edu.au
More information through EDIRC
Public goods; Neutrality; Constrained Pareto efficiency;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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