IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/mlb/wpaper/735.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Access Pricing: a Survey

Author

Listed:
  • Hyde, C.E.
  • Negrin, J.-L.

Abstract

The access price is the charge that a network manager charges to other firms to carry traffic (whether it initiates it or finalizes it) through the network. This charge has gained importance as the regulation of formerly vertically integrated monopolies in some industries has opened them, at least in non-network segments, to competition. The access price is the key instrument that allows the entrants and the incumbent to compete on a level playing field. This paper surveys the access pricing debate and reviews several regulatory experiences. At the theoretical level, the most relevant proposal has been the efficient component pricing rule (ECPR), which states that the access price should compensate the incumbent for its opportunity cost. Nevertheless, this rule could hamper competition in the downstream markets. At a practical level, the discussion has been centered on the inclusion of shared costs and social obligations in the access price. The international trend is towards the use of long run total service incremental cost as basis of the access price.

Suggested Citation

  • Hyde, C.E. & Negrin, J.-L., 2000. "Access Pricing: a Survey," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 735, The University of Melbourne.
  • Handle: RePEc:mlb:wpaper:735
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.economics.unimelb.edu.au/research/2000-2001.html
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    PRICES ; MARKET STRUCTURE ; COMPETITION;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mlb:wpaper:735. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Dandapani Lokanathan (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/demelau.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.