Protecting Antiquities: A Role for Long-Term Leases?
AbstractMost countries prohibit the export of certain antiquities. This practice often leads to illegal excavation and looting for the black market, which damages the items and compromises the archaeological record. We consider the prospect of long-term antiquity leases and sales contracts with a pre-arranged repurchase option. Such mechanisms could raise revenue for the country of origin, while preserving long-term national ownership rights. We show that leases, which leave the country of origin in charge of future recontracting, are optimal mechanisms for resolving adverse selection, and that they have good properties for addressing corruption. Option contracts deliver more revenue now and are therefore useful for reducing credit constraints. Allowing those who disclose the existence of antiquities the right to lease objects overseas for a xed period could create incentives to reveal the location of hidden objects.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The University of Melbourne in its series Department of Economics - Working Papers Series with number 1114.
Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne, 5th Floor, Economics and Commerce Building, Victoria, 3010, Australia
Phone: +61 3 8344 5289
Fax: +61 3 8344 6899
Web page: http://www.economics.unimelb.edu.au
More information through EDIRC
Antiquities; Corruption; Hold Up; Illicit Trade; Market Design;
Other versions of this item:
- Michael Kremer & Tom Wilkening, 1969. "Protecting Antiquities: A Role for Long-Term Leases?," Working Paper 145461, Harvard University OpenScholar.
- Michael Kremer & Tom Wilkening, 2014. "Protecting Antiquities: A Role for Long-Term Leases?," Working Paper 145976, Harvard University OpenScholar.
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- Q34 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts
- Z11 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economics of the Arts and Literature
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Seema Jayachandran & Michael Kremer, 2006.
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 82-92, March.
- Roth, Alvin, 2007.
"Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets,"
2624677, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Benabou, Roland & Tirole, Jean, 2007.
"Identity, Dignity and Taboos: Beliefs as Assets,"
IZA Discussion Papers
2583, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marisa Cerantola).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.