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Monopolistic two-part pricing arrangements

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  • Schmalensee, Richard.

Abstract

This article is mainly concerned with Walter Oi's Disneyland problem: pricing a fixed input (admission to the park or Polaroid cameras) and a variable input (individual rides or Polaroid film) to maximize profit, though profit-constrained welfare maximization is also treated. The structure of demand in such situations is fully described when customers are either households or competitive firms. The implications of customer diversity and other market attributes for optimal policies are presented. The welfare properties of single-price and two-part tariff monopoly equilibria are compared, and potential welfare gains from tying contracts are discussed.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/1958
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management in its series Working papers with number 1105-80..

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Date of creation: 1980
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Handle: RePEc:mit:sloanp:1958

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Postal: MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (MIT), SLOAN SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT, 50 MEMORIAL DRIVE CAMBRIDGE MASSACHUSETTS 02142 USA
Phone: 617-253-2659
Web page: http://mitsloan.mit.edu/
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Postal: MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (MIT), SLOAN SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT, 50 MEMORIAL DRIVE CAMBRIDGE MASSACHUSETTS 02142 USA

Related research

Keywords: HD28 .M414 no.1105-; 80;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Xiangkang Yin, 2000. "Two-part tariff competition in duopoly," Working Papers, School of Economics, La Trobe University 2000.11, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
  2. Burkey, Mark L., 2010. "Geographic access and demand in the market for alcohol," MPRA Paper 36913, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Gaudin, Germain & White, Alexander, 2014. "On the antitrust economics of the electronic books industry," DICE Discussion Papers 147, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  4. María Angeles García Valiñas, 2004. "Eficiencia y equidad en el diseño de precios óptimos para bienes y servicios públicos," Hacienda Pública Española, IEF, IEF, vol. 168(1), pages 95-119, march.
  5. Shastitko, A., 2012. "Competition on Aftermarkets: the Subject Matter and Policy Applications," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 16(4), pages 104-126.
  6. Hartmann, Wesley R. & Nair, Harikesh S., 2007. "Retail Competition and the Dynamics of Consumer Demand for Tied Goods," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business 1990, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  7. Mark Lijesen, 2002. "Welfare effects of vertical integration in energy distribution," CPB Memorandum, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 43, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
  8. Andres Gomez-Lobo, 1996. "The welfare consequences of tariff rebalancing in the domestic gas market," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 17(4), pages 49-65, November.
  9. De Borger, Bruno, 2001. "Discrete choice models and optimal two-part tariffs in the presence of externalities: optimal taxation of cars," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 471-504, July.
  10. Inderst, Roman & Tirosh, Gilad, 2011. "Refunds as a Metering Device," MPRA Paper 53846, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. Sara Hsu & David Kiefer, 2005. "Perfect Price Discrimination is not So Perfect," Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, University of Utah, University of Utah, Department of Economics 2005_04, University of Utah, Department of Economics.
  12. Hovhannisyan, Vardges & Stiegert, Kyle W., 2011. "Imperfect Competition between Milk Manufacturers and Retailers in a Midwestern State in the U.S," 2011 Annual Meeting, February 5-8, 2011, Corpus Christi, Texas, Southern Agricultural Economics Association 98844, Southern Agricultural Economics Association.
  13. De Borger, Bruno, 2000. "Optimal two-part tariffs in a model of discrete choice," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 127-150, April.

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