Aim of this paper is to analyse the equilibrium strategies of two developers in the real estate market, when demands are asymmetric. In particular, we are able to consider three key features of the real estate market. First, the cost of redevelop a building is, at least partially, irreversible. Second, the rent levels for different building vary stochastically over time. Third, demand functions for space are interrelated and may produce positive or negative externalities. Using the method of option pricing theory, we address this issue at three levels. First, we model the investment decision of a firm as a pre-assigned leader as a dynamic stochastic game. Then, we solve for the non-cooperative (decentralised) case, and for the perfectly cooperative case, in which redevelopment of an area is coordinated between firms. Finally, we analyse the efficiency/inefficiency of the equilibria of the game. We find that if one firm has a significantly large comparative advantage, the pre-emptive threat from the rival will be negligible. In this case, short burst and overbuilding phenomena as predicted by Grenadier (1996) will occur only as a limiting case.
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Paper provided by Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, Dipartimento di Statistica in its series Working Papers with number
20060601.