We analyse a model of vertical differentiation focusing on the trade-off between entering early and exploiting monopoly power with a low quality, versus waiting and enjoying a dominant market position with a superior product. We show that, in a relevant parameter region, there exists a unique equilibrium where the leader enters with a lower quality than the follower. This happens when the time span spent by the leader as a monopolist matters the most, i.e., in correspondence of sufficiently low discount rate values, low costs of quality improvement and high consumers' willingness to pay for quality.
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Paper provided by Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, Dipartimento di Statistica in its series Working Papers with number
20060503.