Intelligenza e Coscienza. L'IA tra Searle e Dennett: sviluppi dell'Intelligenza Artificiale
AbstractThis work is focused on Artificial Intelligence and the complex discussion about the possibilities of creating a machine thinking as man does. Through this analysis, it emerges that the chances of success of IA program change according to the different theories about mind which were faced in the last years. In this sense, a big part of the matter depends on the meaning attributed to some mental elements as counsciousness and intentionality: who thinks that they can be reduced to physical processes, is usually agree with the aims of IA and optimist about results. Instead, who doesn't believe that mental elements can be reduced to physical ones is sceptical about IA studies and the possible outcome. In the last part of the article, the argument is the principal themes of IA, starting from the first programs arriving to neural networks and genetic algorithms; in spite of successes that were reached, it seems we are still far from reproducing the human mind in all its components. For this reason, recently, some scientists emphasize the importance to support IA with another subject: the Artificial Counsciousness, AC.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano in its series Departmental Working Papers with number 2005-10.
Date of creation: 01 Jan 2005
Date of revision:
Artificial Intelligence; counsciousness; intentionality; neural networks; genetic algorithms; Artificial Counsciousness.;
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