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Explaining Corporativism and Corruption

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Author Info
Luis G. González-Morales
Abstract

A simple contract-theoretic model is used to show that, in a democratic system, positive political rents and efficient provision of public goods can characterize an equilibrium in the political contest. Moreover, this equilibrium is stable under the assumption that a fraction of the political rents can be shared with a subgroup of voters through corporativist arrangements. These features correspond fairly well to the presidential and corporativist political system of post-revolutionary Mexico.

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Paper provided by University of Dortmund, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number 01_05.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: May 2001
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Handle: RePEc:mik:wpaper:01_05

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  1. Persson, Torsten & Roland, Gerard & Tabellini, Guido, 1997. "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1163-1202, November.
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  2. Dimitriy Gershenson & Herschel I. Grossman, 1999. "Cooption and Repression in the Soviet Union," Working Papers 99-25, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Dal Bo, E., 2000. "Bribing Voters," Economics Series Working Papers 9939, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  4. Tirole, Jean, 1994. "The Internal Organization of Government," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(1), pages 1-29, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & N'Guessan, Tchetche, 1999. "Competition and corruption in an agency relationship," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 271-295, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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