Explaining Corporativism and Corruption
AbstractA simple contract-theoretic model is used to show that, in a democratic system, positive political rents and efficient provision of public goods can characterize an equilibrium in the political contest. Moreover, this equilibrium is stable under the assumption that a fraction of the political rents can be shared with a subgroup of voters through corporativist arrangements. These features correspond fairly well to the presidential and corporativist political system of post-revolutionary Mexico.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Dortmund, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number 01_05.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: May 2001
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-06-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2006-06-17 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-PBE-2006-06-17 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2006-06-17 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-REG-2006-06-17 (Regulation)
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