'Cleaning up' while Cleaning up: Pollution Abatement, Interest Groups and Contingent Trade Policies
AbstractThis paper analyzes the political economy of environmental-policy formation in a trading economy with established rules for administered protection. We argue that the social costs associated with the adoption of an inefficient environmental regime are likely to be compounded by induced restrictions on trade when the effected industries are import competing. The preferences of interest groups for alternative environmental regimes tend to be linked to the legal-institutional setting in which trade policy is conducted. Under existing rules and practices in the area of administered protection, there is reason to believe that interest group preferences for an inefficient approach to pollution control will be strengthened because the adoption of such a regime is more likely to lead to a concomitant increase in trade barriers. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan in its series Working Papers with number 283.
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 1991
Date of revision:
environment ; production ; costs ; policy making ; political power;
Other versions of this item:
- Leidy, Michael P & Hoekman, Bernard M, 1994. " 'Cleaning Up' while Cleaning Up? Pollution Abatement, Interest Groups and Contingent Trade Policies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 78(3-4), pages 241-58, March.
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- Damania, R., 2001. "When the Weak Win: The Role of Investment in Environmental Lobbying," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-22, July.
- Xinpeng Xu, 2000. "International Trade and Environmental Regulation: Time Series Evidence and Cross Section Test," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 17(3), pages 233-257, November.
- Damania, Richard & Fredriksson, Per G. & List, John A., 2003. "Trade liberalization, corruption, and environmental policy formation: theory and evidence," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 490-512, November.
- Bommer, Rolf & Schulze, Gunther G., 1999. "Environmental improvement with trade liberalization," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 639-661, November.
- Rauscher, Michael, 2001. "International Trade, Foreign Investment, and the Enivronment," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 29, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
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