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Models of Partnerships

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  • Paolo Balduzzi

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University of Milan-Bicocca and Edinburgh School of Economics)

Abstract

Beside the traditional public-private dichotomy for the provision of public services, an increasing attention has been devoted to the use of public-private partnerships (PPPs). This paper compares relative inefficiencies of public provision, traditional private provision and PPPs. It also analyses the e?ect of workers’ efforts and incentives on the success of this new device.

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File URL: http://dipeco.economia.unimib.it/repec/pdf/mibwpaper96.pdf
File Function: First version, 2006
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 96.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: May 2006
Date of revision: May 2006
Handle: RePEc:mib:wpaper:96

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  1. Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2005. "Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 616-636, June.
  2. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-58, December.
  3. Josse Delfgaauw & Robert Dur, 2008. "Incentives and Workers' Motivation in the Public Sector," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(525), pages 171-191, 01.
  4. Francois, Patrick, 2000. "'Public service motivation' as an argument for government provision," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(3), pages 275-299, November.
  5. Andrei Shleifer, 1998. "State Versus Private Ownership," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1841, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  6. M.G. Pollitt, 2000. "The Declining Role of the State in Infrastructure Investments in the UK," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0001, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  7. Corneo, Giacomo & Rob, Rafael, 2001. "Working in Public and Private Firms," CEPR Discussion Papers 2719, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Grout, Paul A, 1997. "The Economics of the Private Finance Initiative," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(4), pages 53-66, Winter.
  9. Besley, Timothy J. & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2001. "Government versus Private Ownership of Public Goods," CEPR Discussion Papers 2725, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Paul A. Grout, 2003. "Public and Private Sector Discount Rates in Public-Private Partnerships," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(486), pages C62-C68, March.
  11. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
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