Lorenzo Rocco () (Department of Economics, University of Milan-Bicocca)
Abstract
In this paper we argue that the incentive scheme faced by scientists induces them to promote their activity, publishing on-line their work-in-progress, participating or organising meetings and so on. Such actions produce a huge amount of externalities that may make easier for others to deal with the same topics. Recognizing this influence, we present four game theoretic settings which aim to replicate same features of the research world, such as the "fashions" or the separation between "common researchers" and "stars".
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Paper provided by University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
55.
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Maxim Engers & Joshua S. Gans & Simon Grant & Stephen King, 1999.
"First-Author Conditions,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(4), pages 859-883, August.
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