Experts, Conflicts of Interest, and the Controversial Role of Reputation
AbstractThis paper studies the impact of reputation on the reporting strategy of experts that face conflicts of interest. The framework we propose applies to different settings involv- ing decision makers that rely on experts for making informed decisions, such as financial analysts and goverment agencies. We show that reputation has a non-monotonic effect on the degree of information revelation. In general, truthful revelation is more likely to occur when there is more uncertainty on an expert's ability. Furthermore, above a certain threshold, an increase in reputation always makes truthful revelation more difficult to achieve. Our results shed light on the relationship between the institutional features of the reporting environment and informational efficiency.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 185.
Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2010
Date of revision: Apr 2010
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-05-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2010-05-08 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CTA-2010-05-08 (Contract Theory & Applications)
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