Accounting for age in marital search decisions
AbstractThe average quality of spouse an individual marries varies significantly with age at marriage, peaking in the mid-twenties, then declining through the mid-forties, as does the hazard rate of marriage. Using a non-stationary sequential search model, we identify the search frictions that generate these age-dependent marriage outcomes. We find that the arrival rate of suitors is the dominant friction, responsible for 80% of hazard rate variation and 49% of spouse quality variation. Surprisingly, the distribution of suitor quality is a lower-order concern. Also, individual choice, rather than worsening frictions, is responsible for most of the decline in spouse quality.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Miami, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2013-01.
Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: 11 Jan 2013
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Marriage market frictions; spouse quality; reservation quality over the life-cycle; non-stationary search;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C81 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing Microeconomic Data
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-02-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEM-2013-02-03 (Demographic Economics)
- NEP-DGE-2013-02-03 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
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