Individual moral hazard engendered by health insurance and monopolistic production are both typical phenomena of drug markets. We develop a simple model containing these two elements and show that private agents tend to overinsure themselves against health respectively drug expenses if drugs can be produced at low marginal costs. If marginal costs are negligible, health insurance should be abandoned at all.
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Paper provided by Institut für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik (IVS), University of Mannheim in its series IVS discussion paper series with number
565.
Length: Date of creation: Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:mea:ivswpa:565
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