The Choice Architecture of Choice Architecture: Toward a Non-paternalistic Nudge Policy
AbstractThe paper seeks to recast the goal of nudge policy from a goal of achieving a specific result determined by government or by behavioral economists to a goal of giving individuals as much power as is practical to decide the choice architecture they face. We call a nudge with such a giving individuals “power over choice mechanisms” goal a non-paternalistic nudge policy. The goal of non-paternalistic nudge policy is not to achieve a better result as seen by government or by behavioral economists. The goal of non-paternalistic nudge policy is to achieve a better result as seen by the agents being nudged as revealed through their choices of choice architectures. We argue that non-paternalistic nudge policy fits much better with the values inherent in Classical liberalism than does libertarian paternalistic nudge policy.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Middlebury College, Department of Economics in its series Middlebury College Working Paper Series with number 1036.
Length: 10 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2010
Date of revision:
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libertarian; paternalism; nudge policy; choice architecture; behavioral economics;
Other versions of this item:
- Davind Colander & Andrew Qi Lin Chong, 2010. "The Choice Architecture of Choice Architecture: Toward a Non-Paternalistic Nudge Policy," Journal of Economic Analysis, National Technical University of Athens, vol. 1(1), pages 42-48.
- David Colander & Andrew Qi Lin Chong, 2009. "The Choice Architecture of Choice Architecture: Toward a Nonpaternalistic Nudge Policy," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0916, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
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