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Can Tax Competition Lead to a Race to the Bottom in Europe? A Skeptical View

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Author Info
Thierry Warin ()
André Fourçans

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Abstract

This paper addresses the question of the likelihood of a race to the bottom in a monetary union, like the Euro-zone, that could result from tax competition between countries. This fear of a race to the bottom is used both in the economic literature and the political arena to promote tax harmonization. Using a game theoretical approach with the costs of changing tax policies to analyze the conditions of a race to the bottom, this paper shows that countries may not choose such an extreme strategy. In other words, the extreme case scenario of a race to the bottom is unlikely, and proponents of tax harmonization should base their reasoning upon other assumptions.

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File URL: http://www.middlebury.edu/services/econ/repec/mdl/ancoec/0604.pdf
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Paper provided by Middlebury College, Department of Economics in its series Middlebury College Working Paper Series with number 0604.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mdl:mdlpap:0604

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Related research
Keywords: Monetary union; Economic integration; Tax competition; Tax harmonization; Fiscal competition;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods

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  1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Mendoza, Enrique G. & Tesar, Linda L., 2005. "Why hasn't tax competition triggered a race to the bottom? Some quantitative lessons from the EU," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 163-204, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1995. "Double-Edged Incentives: Institutions and Policy Coordination," CEPR Discussion Papers 1141, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Stephen J. Turnovsky, 1997. "International Macroeconomic Dynamics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262201119.
  5. Devereux, Michael P & Lockwood, Ben & Redoano, Michela, 2002. "Do Countries Compete over Corporate Tax Rates?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3400, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Razin, Assaf & Sadka, Efraim, 1991. "International tax competition and gains from tax harmonization," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 69-76, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Rodrik, D. & Ypersele, T. van, 1999. "When does international capital mobility require tax coordination?," Discussion Paper 27, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  8. LOPEZÊ, Salvador & MARCHANDÊ, Maurice & PESTIEAUÊ, Pierre, 1996. "A Simple Two-Country Model of Redistributive Capital Income Taxation," CORE Discussion Papers 1996025, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  9. Agnes Benassy-Quere & Lionel Fontagne & Amina Lahreche-Revil, 2000. "Foreign Direct Investment and the Prospects for Tax Co-Ordination in Europe," Working Papers 2000-06, CEPII research center. [Downloadable!]
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