AbstractThis paper exploits a survey of manufacturing firms in five transitioning countries to evaluate the factors that affect whether or not information on contractual disputes between firms is disseminated to other market participants. We find that these reputation flows are channeled both through informal communication among firms as well as through third party organizations; in addition, they are sensitive to firms' perceptions of the macro-institutional environment and specific features of the bilateral relationship in which the dispute occurs. The finding that some trade associations play a meaningful role in coordinating these flows suggests that their private and social value is significant.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Middlebury College, Department of Economics in its series Middlebury College Working Paper Series with number 0239.
Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2002
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
reputation; information; transition; business associations;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
- O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
- P3 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2002-09-21 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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