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Corruption and production: a policy analysis

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  • Raffaella Coppier

    (University of Macerata)

  • Elisabetta Michetti

    (University of Macerata)

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    Abstract

    � This paper analyzes the relation existing between corruption, monitoring and output in an economy. By solving a dynamic game we prove that equilibrium output is a non-linear upper-hemicontinuous function (MP function) of the monitoring level implemented by the State on corruption, presenting 3 different equilibrium scenarios. According to our model, we analyze the optimal strategy depending on the policy objective of the State and we prove that if the State is budget constrained the optimal policy can lead the economy to an equilibrium with widespread corruption and maximum production.

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    File URL: http://www.unimc.it/dief/wpaper/wpaper00022/filePaper
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Macerata University, Department of Finance and Economic Sciences in its series Working Papers with number 22-2004.

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    Date of creation: Oct 2004
    Date of revision: Oct 2008
    Publication status: Published in Economic Modelling, Vol. 23, N. 4 pp 622-637
    Handle: RePEc:mcr:wpdief:wpaper00022

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    Keywords: Policy analysis; Equilibrium production; Corruption; Dynamic game;

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    1. Acemoglu, Daron & Verdier, Thierry, 1998. "Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(450), pages 1381-1403, September.
    2. Besley, Timothy & McLaren, John, 1993. "Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(416), pages 119-41, January.
    3. Mauro, Paolo, 1998. "Corruption and the composition of government expenditure," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 263-279, June.
    4. Del Monte, Alfredo & Papagni, Erasmo, 2001. "Public expenditure, corruption, and economic growth: the case of Italy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 1-16, March.
    5. Mauro, Paolo, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712, August.
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