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Shut Up and Fish: The Role of Communication when Output-Sharing is used to Manage a Common Pool Resource

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Author Info
Neil Buckley
Stuart Mestelman
R. Andrew Muller
Stephan Schott
Jingjing Zhang

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Abstract

Schott et al. (2007) have shown that the “tragedy of the commons” can be overcome when individuals share their output equally in groups of optimal size and there is no communication. The assignment to groups as either strangers or partners does not significantly affect this outcome. In this paper we investigate whether communication changes these results. Communication reduces shirking, increases aggregate effort and reduces aggregate rents, but only when communication and output-sharing groups are linked. The effect is stronger for fixed- membership output-sharing groups (the partner treatment) than for output-sharing groups with randomly reassigned members (the stranger treatment). Performance is not distinguishable from the no-communication treatments when communication is present but groups are sharing output within groups other than the groups within which they communicate. Communication also tends to enhance the negative effect of the partnered group assignment on the equality of individual payoffs.

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File URL: http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/econ/rsrch/papers/archive/2009-15.pdf
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Paper provided by McMaster University in its series Department of Economics Working Papers with number 2009-15.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2009
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Handle: RePEc:mcm:deptwp:2009-15

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Related research
Keywords: Common pool resources; Communication; Coordination; Cooperation; Free-riding Behaviour in Teams; Partners and Strangers; Experiments;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Hackett Steven & Schlager Edella & Walker James, 1994. "The Role of Communication in Resolving Commons Dilemmas: Experimental Evidence with Heterogeneous Appropriators," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 99-126, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Heintzelman, Martin & Salant, Stephen W. & Schott, Stephan, 2008. "Putting Free-Riding to Work: A Partnership Solution to the Common-Property Problem," MPRA Paper 9804, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Schram, Arthur & Sonnemans, Joep, 1996. "Why people vote: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 417-442, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Kenneth Chan & Stuart Mestelman & Robert Moir & R. Muller, 1999. "Heterogeneity and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 5-30, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Stephan Schott & Neil Buckley & Stuart Mestelman & R. Muller, 2007. "Output sharing in partnerships as a common pool resource management instrument," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 37(4), pages 697-711, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Bochet, Olivier & Page, Talbot & Putterman, Louis, 2006. "Communication and punishment in voluntary contribution experiments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 11-26, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Andrew Muller & Michelle Vickers, 1996. "Communication in a Common Pool Resource Environment with Probabilistic Destruction," Department of Economics Working Papers 1996-02, McMaster University. [Downloadable!]
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