IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/mcm/deptwp/2007-08.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Tenancy Default, Excess Demand and the Rental Market

Author

Listed:
  • Katherine Cuff Nicolas Marceau

Abstract

We develop a model of a competitive rental housing market with an endogenous rate of tenancy default arising from income uncertainty. Potential tenants must choose to engage in a costly search for rental housing, and must commit to a rental agreement before the uncertainty is resolved. We show that there are two possible equilibria in this market: a market-clearing equilibrium and an equilibrium with excess demand. Therefore, individuals might not have access to rental housing because they are unable to afford to look for housing, they are unable to pay their rent, or with excess demand in the market they are simply unable to find a rental unit. We show that government regulations affecting the cost of default to the housing suppliers and the quality of rental units can have different effects on the equilibrium variables of interest — rental rate, quantity demanded and supplied, and access to rental housing — depending on the type of equilibria in the market. A numerical example illustrates these results.

Suggested Citation

  • Katherine Cuff Nicolas Marceau, 2007. "Tenancy Default, Excess Demand and the Rental Market," Department of Economics Working Papers 2007-08, McMaster University.
    • Handle: RePEc:mcm:deptwp:2007-08
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/econ/rsrch/papers/archive/2007-08.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John M. Quigley & Steven Raphael, 2004. "Is Housing Unaffordable? Why Isn't It More Affordable?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 191-214, Winter.
    2. Chester Hartman & David Robinson, 2003. "Evictions: The hidden housing problem," Housing Policy Debate, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(4), pages 461-501, January.
    3. Richard Arnott, 1995. "Time for Revisionism on Rent Control?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 99-120, Winter.
    4. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    5. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-444, June.
    6. Kaushik Basu & Patrick M. Emerson, 2003. "Efficiency Pricing, Tenancy Rent Control and Monopolistic Landlords," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 70(278), pages 223-232, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Katherine Cuff & Nicolas Marceau, 2007. "Equilibrium Excess Demand in the Rental Housing Market (revised)," Cahiers de recherche 0744, CIRPEE.
    2. Weber, Jan Philip & Lee, Gabriel, . "On the Measure of Private Rental Market Regulation Index and its Effect on Housing Rents: Cross Country Evidence," Beiträge zur Immobilienwirtschaft, University of Regensburg, Department of Economics, number 21, August.
    3. Anton Korinek & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2018. "Artificial Intelligence and Its Implications for Income Distribution and Unemployment," NBER Chapters, in: The Economics of Artificial Intelligence: An Agenda, pages 349-390, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Waters, George A., 2013. "Quantity rationing of credit and the Phillips curve," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 68-80.
    5. Arnott, Richard & Shevyakhova, Elizaveta, 2014. "Tenancy rent control and credible commitment in maintenance," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 72-85.
    6. Greenwald, Bruce C. & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1987. "Imperfect information, credit markets and unemployment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-2), pages 444-456.
    7. Stephen Malpezzi, 2023. "Housing affordability and responses during times of stress: A preliminary look during the COVID‐19 pandemic," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 41(1), pages 9-40, January.
    8. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1988. "Money, Credit, and Business Fluctuations," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 64(4), pages 307-322, December.
    9. Joshua Henkel, 2022. "Economics & Biology: The whole is something besides the parts – a complementary approach to a bioeconomy," Bremen Papers on Economics & Innovation 2210, University of Bremen, Faculty of Business Studies and Economics.
    10. Yannick L'Horty & Mathieu Bunel & Pascale Petit, 2019. "Testing for redlining in the labour market," Spatial Economic Analysis, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(2), pages 153-173, April.
    11. Etienne Wasmer & Philippe Weil, 2004. "The Macroeconomics of Labor and Credit Market Imperfections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 944-963, September.
    12. Malcolm Sawyer, 1999. "The Kaleckian Analysis and the New Millennium," Review of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(3), pages 303-319.
    13. Ciccia, Diego & Distefano, Rosaria & Reito, Francesco, 2022. "The mismatch between potential and actual shirking in a model of bureaucracy," MPRA Paper 115452, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Laurent Thévenot, 1989. "Équilibre et rationalité dans un univers complexe," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 40(2), pages 147-198.
    15. Landeta Rodríguez, Jon & Barrutia Güenaga, Jon & Hoyos Iruarrizaga, Jon & Araujo de la Mata, Andrés, 2015. "Initiatives for the improvement of continuous management training," Cuadernos de Gestión, Universidad del País Vasco - Instituto de Economía Aplicada a la Empresa (IEAE).
    16. Ha-Joon Chang & Ali Cheema & L. Mises, 2002. "Conditions For Successful Technology Policy In Developing Countries—Learning Rents, State Structures, And Institutions," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(4-5), pages 369-398.
    17. Eric Bengtsson & Engelbert Stockhammer, 2018. "Wages, income distribution and economic growth in Scandinavia," Working Papers PKWP1811, Post Keynesian Economics Society (PKES).
    18. Pender, John L. & Kerr, John M., 1998. "Determinants of farmers' indigenous soil and water conservation investments in semi-arid India," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, vol. 19(1-2), pages 113-125, September.
    19. Stefano Falcone, 2022. "Do Evictions Increase Crime? Evidence from Nuisance Ordinances in Ohio," Working Papers 1359, Barcelona School of Economics.
    20. George A. Akerlof, 2003. "Behavioral Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic Behavior," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 47(1), pages 25-47, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tenancy Default; Excess Demand; Rental Housing Policies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • R21 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Household Analysis - - - Housing Demand
    • R31 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Housing Supply and Markets
    • R38 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Government Policy
    • D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Perfect Competition

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mcm:deptwp:2007-08. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/demcmca.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.