Government behaviour is traditionally represented in an exogenous or an undemocratic fashion. Given the democratic context of most Western free-market societies and the theoretical difficulty in aggregating preferences, this model suggests an alternative method of explaining "optimal democratic" political decision-making by endogenising voting behaviour and the design of "optimal" policy programmes in terms of government expenditures, budget deficits, and income tax rates. In doing so, the model will highlight the extent to which changes in the distributions of income and wealth interact with the political development of a society.
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Paper provided by McGill University, Department of Economics in its series Departmental Working Papers with number
1996-01.