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The Truth about Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection. Eighteenth Annual Herbert Lourie Memorial Lecture on Health Policy

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Author Info
Mark V. Pauly (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania)
Abstract

This brief is actually going to have two levels. One level will go with the advertised title, and I’ll tell you my current views on the truth about moral hazard and adverse selection. Adverse selection will serve as somewhat of a handmaid of moral hazard, as you will see. That’s one level. The other level, though, which continues to surprise me, is that these two topics—they’re two buzzwords from insurance theory—have generated an enormous amount of policy interest and, yes, passion. Some people passionately believe some things about moral hazard that others passionately disbelieve. And so as part of this second level I will draw back a bit from the actual subject matter to ask a kind of positive public policy question: Why is it that some people can get so passionate about a subject that seems fairly esoteric?

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File URL: http://www-cpr.maxwell.syr.edu/pbriefs/pb36.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Center for Policy Research, Maxwell School, Syracuse University in its series Center for Policy Research Policy Briefs with number 36.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:max:cprpbr:36

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Related research
Keywords: health insurance; adverse selection; moral hazard;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies
I10 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - General

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-16.


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