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Window-Dressing and Lobbying in Performance-Budgeting: a Model for the Public Sector

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  • Ivo Bischoff

    ()
    (University of Kassel)

  • Frédéric Blaeschke

    (University of Kassel)

Abstract

Performance budgeting schemes in the public sector have to operate with imperfect performance measures. We argue that these imperfections lead to wasteful fund-seeking (window dressing and lobbying) by the administrative units that produce public services. We develop a game-theoretical model to analyse the trade-off between the productivity-enhancing effect of performance budgeting and the social waste it induces. The optimal performancebudgeting scheme crucially depends on the objective functions of administrative units, the available performance signal and the welfare function used. We compare a performance signal base on units’ effort to a signal based on their output and show that the former evokes more social waste while the latter amplifies regional inequality. Forgone welfare gains or even welfare losses arise when the government is opportunistic. Our model and its major conclusions apply to a large array of publicly installed contests such as programs of international organisations like the IMF and conditional grant schemes in federalist countries.

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File URL: https://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/magkspapers/12-2012_bischoff.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung) in its series MAGKS Papers on Economics with number 201212.

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Length: 43 pages
Date of creation: 2012
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Publication status: Forthcoming in
Handle: RePEc:mar:magkse:201212

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Keywords: Performance budgeting; rent-seeking; bureaucracy; public-sector efficiency; conditional grants; opportunistic government;

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