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Strategic communication: screening and signaling in a freelance journalist - editor game

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Author Info
Ascensión Andina-Díaz () (Department of Economic Theory, Universidad de Málaga)
Abstract

We model strategic communication as a two-period game between an advisor and a decision maker, in which the advisor has private information on a policy-relevant state of the world but does not know the motives of the decision maker. If the advisor has the desire to please the decision maker and there is a positive probability that the decision maker values information, we identify different modes of communication that lead to information disclosure. We discuss our results in the context of a freelance journalist - editor game. Among the results is that if the journalist sufficiently values second period payoff, no information is transmitted in period one and the only equilibria implies information manipulation. Additionally, we show that the quality of the communication process does not depend on who manipulates the information although welfare does.

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File URL: http://webdeptos.uma.es/THEconomica/malagawpseries/Papers/METCwp2008-13.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center in its series Working Papers with number 2008-13.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mal:wpaper:2008-13

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Related research
Keywords: Strategic Communication; Conformity; Screening; Signaling; Mass Media;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2006. "Media Bias and Reputation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(2), pages 280-316, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Gabszewicz, Jean J. & Laussel, Dider & Sonnac, Nathalie, 2001. "Press advertising and the ascent of the 'Pensee Unique'," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 641-651, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Ascensión Andina-Díaz, 2008. "Media Competition and Information Disclosure," Working Papers 2008-5, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center. [Downloadable!]
  4. Stephen Morris, 2001. "Political Correctness," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 231-265, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
  6. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1994. "A Theory of Conformity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 841-77, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Sendhil Mullainathan & Andrei Shleifer, 2005. "The Market for News," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1031-1053, September. [Downloadable!]
  8. Baron, David P., 2006. "Persistent media bias," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 1-36, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-51, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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