Threats and demonstrations of power: experimental results on bilateral bargaining
AbstractWe test the empirical effectiveness of threats in equilibrating bargaining power in simple bilateral bargaining games. Our experimental design is based on the two-player versions of the multibidding game (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2001) and the bid-and-propose game (Navarro and Perea, 2005) that build on the ultimatum game and balance parties' bargaining power by auctioning the role of the proposer in the first stage. We show that, while both mechanisms implement the fair split in their subgame-perfect Nash-equilibrium, they induce different results in the laboratory. Subjects do not react to threats that lie off the the equilibrium path in the expected way, even if these threats are theoretically credible as they belong to the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. In particular, it seems that subjects feel the need to show their bargaining power as if punishment that never happens could not constitute a credible threat.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center in its series Working Papers with number 2008-11.
Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2008
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
bargaining; experiments; fairness; Myerson value; ultimatum game;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-10-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2008-10-13 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2008-10-13 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2008-10-13 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Noemí NAVARRO & Róbert VESZTEG, 2007. "Fair ultimatum: an experimental study of the Myerson value," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du DÃ©partement d'EconomÃ©trie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 07.05, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
- repec:ner:carlos:info:hdl:10016/263 is not listed on IDEAS
- Noemí Navarro & Andrés Perea, 2001. "Bargaining In Networks And The Myerson Value," Economics Working Papers we016121, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
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