Volkswagen vs. Porsche. A Power-Index Analysis
AbstractAfter Porsche SE took over Volkswagen AG, its supervisory board consists of three groups: The Porsche shareholders hold 6 seats, while the 324,000 Volkswagen employees and the 12,000 Porsche employees will be represented by 3 delegates each. This paper perceives each of these three groups as unitary players and presents a power-index analysis of this supervisory board. It shows that, unless the Porsche employees are made completely powerless, Porsche and VW employees will have identical power regardless of the actual distribution of seats on the employees' side. This analysis demonstrates that the request of the Volkswagen employees (for more seats than the Porsche employees in the future supervisory board) is unfounded.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management in its series FEMM Working Papers with number 09007.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2009
Date of revision:
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Banzhaf power-index; supervisory board; societas europeae;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
- M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics
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- R J Johnston, 1978. "On the measurement of power: some reactions to Laver," Environment and Planning A, Pion Ltd, London, Pion Ltd, London, vol. 10(8), pages 907-914, August.
- Balsmeier, Benjamin & Bermig, Andreas & Dilger, Alexander & Geyer, Hannah, 2011.
"Corporate governance and employee power in the boardroom: An applied game theoretical analysis,"
Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics, University of MÃ¼nster, Institute for Organisational Economics
9/2011, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics.
- Balsmeier, Benjamin & Bermig, Andreas & Dilger, Alexander, 2013. "Corporate governance and employee power in the boardroom: An applied game theoretic analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 51-74.
- Roland Kirstein & Matthias Peiss, 2013. "Quantitative Machtkonzepte in der Ökonomik," FEMM Working Papers, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management 130004, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
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