Information Revelation in an Online Auction with Common Values
AbstractThe Hard Close auction has become a familiar auction format in online markets and in a private value framework this dynamic second-price auction format has experimentally been tested in recent studies. Considering a common value framework, Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003) demonstrate that in the Hard Close auction format bidders, using a sniping strategy, do not provide information during the auction. We provide contrary results from a laboratory experiment. Bidders provide information during the bidding process, resulting in different bid functions that depend on the bidders private information rank.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management in its series FEMM Working Papers with number 08010.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2008
Date of revision:
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auctions; electronic markets; experiments;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-04-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2008-04-21 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-EXP-2008-04-21 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2008-04-21 (Game Theory)
- NEP-ICT-2008-04-21 (Information & Communication Technologies)
- NEP-MKT-2008-04-21 (Marketing)
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