This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

The “Rainmaker’s Dilemma:” Bad Debt Loss Insurance in Settlement and Litigation

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Roland Kirstein () (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg)
Annette Kirstein (University of Karlsruhe)
Hans Gerhard (Saarland University)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze the impact of Bad Debt Loss Insurance on settlement outcomes. A huge success in a settlement or trial can turn into a disaster when the defendant goes bankrupt before paying the plaintiff’s claim. “Rainmakers” face the following dilemma: the greater the success, the greater the defendant’s bankruptcy risk. The starting point of our paper is a simple trial and litigation model with perfect and complete information. We add the possibility of a defendant’s bankruptcy, and of buying Bad Debt Loss Insurance for both the settlement and the trial stage. We demonstrate that trial insurance and settlement insurance have different impacts on the predicted outcome of settlement negotiations. Trial insurance tends to increase the settlement result; therefore, it generates a contract rent for the insurer and the insured. Settlement insurance, however, may have the opposite effect, as it decreases the settlement result.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.ww.uni-magdeburg.de/fwwdeka/femm/a2008_Dateien/2008_02.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version, 2008
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management in its series FEMM Working Papers with number 08002.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mag:wpaper:08002

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Universit�tsplatz 2, Geb�ude W und I, 39106 Magdeburg
Phone: (0391) 67-18 584
Fax: (0391) 67-12 120
Web page: http://www.ww.uni-magdeburg.de
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Guido Henkel).

Related research
Keywords: Strategic Insurance British Cost Allocation Rule Nash Bargaining Solution

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Roland Kirstein, 2000. "Risk Neutrality and Strategic Insurance," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan Journals, vol. 25(2), pages 251-261, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by encouraging others to register as authors.

This page was last updated on 2008-7-2.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.