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The Impact of Cheap Talk on Supply Chain Performance in Case of Asymmetric Information: An Experimental Investigation

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Author Info
Karl Inderfurth () (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg)
Abdolkarim Sadrieh () (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg)
Guido Voigt () (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg)

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Abstract

The use of screening contracts is a common approach to solve supply chain coordination problems under asymmetric information. One major assumption in this context is that subjects will rather use their private information strategically than to reveal them truthfully, if they do not get any incentives to do this. This harms supply chain performance. This paper investigates the influence of costless pre-game communication (i.e. communication without any direct incentives) between a supplier and a buyer in a lotsizing framework. A laboratory experiment was conducted to test, whether this costless pre-game communication has (in contradiction to standard game-theory) an influence on supply chain coordination.

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File URL: http://www.ww.uni-magdeburg.de/fwwdeka/femm/a2008_Dateien/2008_01.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version, 2008
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management in its series FEMM Working Papers with number 08001.

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Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mag:wpaper:08001

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Related research
Keywords: experimental economics; screening contracts; supply chain coordination;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
M11 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - Production Management
C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-10.

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