Subsidizing Extra Jobs: Promoting Employment by Taming the Unions
AbstractWe study the subsidization of extra jobs in a general equilibrium framework. While the previous literature focuses on symmetric marginal employment subsidies where firms are rewarded when they increase employment but punished when they reduce their workforce, we consider an asymmetric scheme that only rewards employment expansion. This changes the incidence substantially. In the asymmetric case without punishment, it becomes less costly for firms to lay off a substantial fraction of their workforce when trade unions raise wages. This tames the unions, which causes wage moderation and raises aggregate employment and welfare. For moderate subsidy rates, all unions prefer to restrain their wage claims. At sufficiently high subsidy rates, labor market conditions improve so much that some unions enforce higher wages and let their firms shrink. This displacement of firms might have a negative impact on employment and welfare.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management in its series FEMM Working Papers with number 07020.
Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2007
Date of revision:
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unemployment; marginal employment subsidies; general equilibrium;
Other versions of this item:
- Andreas Knabe & Ronnie Schöb, 2007. "Subsidizing Extra Jobs: Promoting Employment by Taming the Unions," CESifo Working Paper Series 2130, CESifo Group Munich.
- J38 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Public Policy
- J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Public Policy
- H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
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