Sharing and Anti-Sharing in Teams
AbstractCompared to budget-balanced Sharing contracts, Anti-Sharing may improve the efficiency of teams. The Anti-Sharer collects a fixed payment from all team members; he receives the actual output and pays out its value to them. If a team members becomes Anti-Sharer, he will be unproductive in equilibrium. Hence, internal Anti-Sharing fails to yield the first-best outcome. Anti-Sharing is more likely to yield a higher team profit than Sharing, the larger the team, the curvature of the production function, or the marginal effort cost. Sharing is more likely to be better, the greater the marginal product, the cross-partials of the production function, or the curvature of the effort cost.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management in its series FEMM Working Papers with number 07001.
Length: 7 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2007
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Universitätsplatz 2, Gebäude W und I, 39106 Magdeburg
Phone: (0391) 67-18 584
Fax: (0391) 67-12 120
Web page: http://www.ww.uni-magdeburg.de
More information through EDIRC
Budget-breaker; supermodularity; constrained efficiency;
Other versions of this item:
- Kirstein, Roland & Cooter, Robert D, 2006. "Sharing and Anti-Sharing in Teams," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt07z8m8wm, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-03-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2007-03-24 (Business Economics)
- NEP-MAC-2007-03-24 (Macroeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Choi, Yoon K., 1993. "Managerial incentive contracts with a production externality," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 37-42.
- Cooter, Robert D. & Porat, Ariel, 2002. "Anti-Insurance," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt1vw0d9sf, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
- Eric Rasmusen, 1987. "Moral Hazard in Risk-Averse Teams," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 428-435, Autumn.
- Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 1971.
"Production, Information Costs and Economic Organizations,"
UCLA Economics Working Papers
10A, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-95, December.
- Strausz, Roland, 1999. "Efficiency in Sequential Partnerships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 140-156, March.
- Cooter, Robert & Porat, Ariel, 2002. "Anti-insurance," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(2), pages 203-32, June.
- Bose, Arup & Pal, Debashis & Sappington, David E.M., 2010.
"Asymmetric treatment of identical agents in teams,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 54(7), pages 947-961, October.
- Debashis Pal & Arup Bose & David Sappington, 2008. "Asymmetric Treatment of Identical Agents in Teams," University of Cincinnati, Economics Working Papers Series 2008-08, University of Cincinnati, Department of Economics.
- Kirstein, Roland & Cooter, Robert D, 2006. "Anti-Sharing as a Theory of Partnerships and Firms," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt4441r9r1, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guido Henkel).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.