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Sharing and Anti-Sharing in Teams

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Author Info
Roland Kirstein () (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg)
Robert D. Cooter

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Abstract

Compared to budget-balanced Sharing contracts, Anti-Sharing may improve the efficiency of teams. The Anti-Sharer collects a fixed payment from all team members; he receives the actual output and pays out its value to them. If a team members becomes Anti-Sharer, he will be unproductive in equilibrium. Hence, internal Anti-Sharing fails to yield the first-best outcome. Anti-Sharing is more likely to yield a higher team profit than Sharing, the larger the team, the curvature of the production function, or the marginal effort cost. Sharing is more likely to be better, the greater the marginal product, the cross-partials of the production function, or the curvature of the effort cost.

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File URL: http://www.ww.uni-magdeburg.de/fwwdeka/femm/a2007_Dateien/2007_01.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version, 2007
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management in its series FEMM Working Papers with number 07001.

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Length: 7 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mag:wpaper:07001

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Related research
Keywords: Budget-breaker supermodularity constrained efficiency

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Choi, Yoon K., 1993. "Managerial incentive contracts with a production externality," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 37-42. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Cooter, Robert & Porat, Ariel, 2002. "Anti-insurance," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(2), pages 203-32, June.
  3. Eric Rasmusen, 1987. "Moral Hazard in Risk-Averse Teams," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 428-435, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Xavier Vives, 2005. "Complementarities and Games: New Developments," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 43(2), pages 437-479, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Strausz, Roland, 1999. "Efficiency in Sequential Partnerships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 140-156, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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