Sudden Termination Auctions – An Experimental Study
AbstractThe design of markets has become a major issue due to the capability of online operators to implement almost any set of market rules overnight. With this study we contribute to the literature of market design by presenting a theoretical and experimental analysis of sudden termination auctions. Our main focus is on the candle auction that has a positive termination probability at any time in the course of the auction. The second price candle auction which is technically demanding and rarely implemented offline proves to be a faster and equally efficient alternative to standard hard close auctions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management in its series FEMM Working Papers with number 06024.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2006
Date of revision:
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Web page: http://www.ww.uni-magdeburg.de
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auctions; termination rules; electronic markets;
Other versions of this item:
- Sascha Füllbrunn & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2012. "Sudden Termination Auctions—An Experimental Study," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(2), pages 519-540, 06.
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-01-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2008-01-05 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2008-01-05 (Game Theory)
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- Sascha Füllbrunn, 2007. "Collusion or Sniping in simultaneous ascending Auctions," FEMM Working Papers, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management 07025, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
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