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Sudden Termination Auctions – An Experimental Study

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Author Info
Sascha Füllbrunn () (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg)
Abdolkarim Sadrieh () (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg)

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Abstract

The design of markets has become a major issue due to the capability of online operators to implement almost any set of market rules overnight. With this study we contribute to the literature of market design by presenting a theoretical and experimental analysis of sudden termination auctions. Our main focus is on the candle auction that has a positive termination probability at any time in the course of the auction. The second price candle auction which is technically demanding and rarely implemented offline proves to be a faster and equally efficient alternative to standard hard close auctions.

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File URL: http://www.ww.uni-magdeburg.de/fwwdeka/femm/a2006_Dateien/2006_24.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version, 2006
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management in its series FEMM Working Papers with number 06024.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mag:wpaper:06024

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Related research
Keywords: auctions termination rules electronic markets

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions

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  1. Sascha Füllbrunn, 2007. "Collusion or Sniping in simultaneous ascending Auctions," FEMM Working Papers 07025, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2008-10-10.

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