Impact of Regulatory Agencies on the Efficiency of Publicly-Owned Utilities
AbstractWe compare the economic efficiency of a publicly-owned utility directly controlled by the government with a publicly-owned utility regulated by a public utility commission (PUC). Regulation by a PUC is modelled as a Nash equilibrium of a game between two principals, the government and the PUC, each of them having control over a subset of decision variables determining the utility performance. A utility manager, who has private information over a productivity parameter, is the agent. Comparisons of both regulatory regimes are made with respect to output, choice of inputs, manager's information rent and firm's profit. Reasons for which the government should prefer one regulatory regime over the other are discussed. The recent regulatory reform of electricity markets in the province of Quebec (Canada) provides an illustration of the model.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université Laval - Département d'économique in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 9915.
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Regulation; Public Enterprises;
Other versions of this item:
- Bernard, J.T. & Nouhi, M. & Roland, M., 1999. "Impact of Regulatory Agencies on the Efficiency of Publicly-Owned Utilities," Papers 99-09, Laval - Recherche en Energie.
- L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
- L97 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Utilities: General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2002-04-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-EFF-2002-06-18 (Efficiency & Productivity)
- NEP-MIC-2002-04-15 (Microeconomics)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Johanne Perron).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.