Subsidy-Allocation Rules for Infant Industries
AbstractThe optimal subsidy allocation mechanism is studied for a benevolent public-policy-decision maker faced with the task of assisting a domestic "infant" firm in its attempt to become established in an international industry.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université Laval - Département d'économique in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 9621.
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H80 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - General
- H81 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Loans; Loan Guarantees; Credits; Grants; Bailouts
- L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
- L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
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