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| Abstract |
The Serial Cost Sharing Rule has been conceived originally for problems where agents ask for different quantities of an homogeneous private good, the sum of which is produced by a single facility. In this context, it is endowed with a variety of desirable equity and coherency properties. This paper investigates the extension of this rule to the context where agents ask many goods that may be specific to some of them and where the aggregation rule may be very general. It begins with a systematic analysis and some extension of different properties found in the literature on cost sharing. It then shows that, while the extension of the Serial Cost Sharing Rule to the general context is possible, it involves a considerable weakening of some of the properties that hold with a single private good, when they must not simply be abandoned.
La règle de partage séquentiel des coùts a été conçue à l'origine pour le cas où les demandes des agents portent sur un bien privé homogène, produit par une technologie non reproductible. Dans un tel contexte, cette règle satisfait de nombreuses propriétés d'équité et de cohérence. Dans cet article, on étudie l'extension de cette règle aux cas où les demandes des agents peuvent être des vecteurs qui ne représentent pas forcément des biens homogènes entre les agents et dont l'agrégation ne se fait pas uniquement via la sommation. On commence par une analyse systématique de différentes propriétés de méthodes de partage des coûts énoncées dans la littérature et par une extension de certaines d'entre elles. On montre notamment qu'il est possible de généraliser de façon satisfaisante la règle séquentielle de partage des coûts mais que cet exercice impose un affaiblissement important, voire un abandon pur et simple, de certaines propriétés qui sont satisfaites avec un seul bien privé.
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| Related research |
Find related papers by JEL classification:
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-15.