AbstractThis paper presents a model of conflict which allows belligerents to recruit both adults and children as soldiers. Warlords fight over the country's productive (i.e. non-military) output, and are aware of the tradeoff involved in recruitment: anyone who becomes a soldier cannot produce output. In equilibrium, child recruitment is determined by children's productivity relative to adults in both war and civilian production. The model's findings have implications for arms traffic control and bans on child labor.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CIRPEE in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 0920.
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Child soldiers; civil war; small arms trade; child labor; comparative advantage;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
- J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-07-03 (All new papers)
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