We propose to analyse the hyperbolic discounting preferences effect on the innovator's research investment decision. Investing in research allows him to acquire information, and then to reduce the uncertainty of the risks of his project. We find that whatever the innovator's preferences, that is hyperbolic or time-consistent, there exists a research investment constraint that limits the information acquisition. However, even if the information is free, while a time-consistent agent always acquires information, a hyperbolic agent may prefer staying ignorant. We also emphasize that hyperbolic discounting preferences induce and information precision constraint that leads the hyperbolic innovator to ignore the information whilethe time-consistent innovator gets it. Moreover, the possibility that the agent has a commitment power in the future strengthens this ignorance strategy. Finally, we investigate the impact of existing liability rules on the innovator's decision to acquire information.
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