On the Formation of Buyer-Seller Relationships when Product Quality is Perfectly Observable
AbstractThis study explores the formation of buyer-seller relationships in markets with observable quality. We develop a model that explains why relationships form in equilibrium within such markets. A key feature of our model is that as individuals gain experience in the marketplace, they resolve uncertainty over unobserved bargainer types. Relationships thus form as a means to reduce such transactions costs and uncertainty. We explore the usefulness of our theory by using a battery of simulations and experimental treatments. Overall, we find that our theoretical predictions are largely confirmed. Interestingly, the quantitative impact of relationships on overall market efficiency depends critically on the extend to which market structure affects the matching of buyers and sellers that could profitably transact. In certain important cases, a greater number of buyer-seller relationships can reduce market efficiency.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CIRPEE in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 0740.
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Field experiments; pricing; market structure;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-11-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2007-11-17 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2007-11-17 (Microeconomics)
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