Gender Discrimination, Human Capital, and Marriage
AbstractWe use a household bargaining model to provide a rationale for gender discrimination in pay to disappear. In societies where women have a credible outside option to marriage and have the right to bargain with their future husband over the benefits of their union, the elimination of gender discrimination in pay is likely to come as a Pareto improvement. If educated women face discrimination in the labor market, they may exploit their biological comparative advantage in child-bearing to extract a high enough compensatory transfer from their male partner, in exchange for the right to share custody of children. Anticipating this, men will have a vested interest in supporting the elimination of gender discrimination in pay exists, it is likely that many women's rights including the right to start their own business are still violated.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CIRPEE in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 0314.
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Marriage; Bargaining; Education; Discrimination; Women's Rights;
Other versions of this item:
- I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
- J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
- O33 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
- J20 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - General
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- Helmut Rainer, 2008.
"Gender discrimination and efficiency in marriage: the bargaining family under scrutiny,"
Journal of Population Economics,
Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 305-329, April.
- Rainer, Helmut, 2008. "Gender discrimination and efficiency in marriage: The bargaining family under scrutiny," Munich Reprints in Economics 19817, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Helmut Rainer, 2004. "Gender Discrimination and Effciency in Marriage: the Bargaining Family under Scrutiny," Economics Discussion Papers 586, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- Helmut Rainer, 2005. "Gender Discrimination and Efficiency in Marriage: the Bargaining Family under Scrutiny," CRIEFF Discussion Papers 0512, Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm.
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