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Gender Discrimination, Human Capital, and Marriage

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  • Dessy, Sylvain
  • Pallage, Stéphane

Abstract

We use a household bargaining model to provide a rationale for gender discrimination in pay to disappear. In societies where women have a credible outside option to marriage and have the right to bargain with their future husband over the benefits of their union, the elimination of gender discrimination in pay is likely to come as a Pareto improvement. If educated women face discrimination in the labor market, they may exploit their biological comparative advantage in child-bearing to extract a high enough compensatory transfer from their male partner, in exchange for the right to share custody of children. Anticipating this, men will have a vested interest in supporting the elimination of gender discrimination in pay exists, it is likely that many women's rights including the right to start their own business are still violated.

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File URL: http://www.cirpee.org/fileadmin/documents/Cahiers_2003/CIRPEE03-14.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CIRPEE in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 0314.

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Date of creation: 2003
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Handle: RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0314

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Keywords: Marriage; Bargaining; Education; Discrimination; Women's Rights;

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Cited by:
  1. Helmut Rainer, 2008. "Gender discrimination and efficiency in marriage: the bargaining family under scrutiny," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 305-329, April.

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