An empirical examination of repeated auctions for biodiversity conservation contracts
AbstractThe European Union’s Council Regulation on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development has introduced auctioning as a new instrument for granting agri-environmental payments and awarding conservation contracts for the recent multi-annual budgetary plan. This paper therefore deals with the conception and results of two case study auctions for conservation contracts. Results of two field experiments show much differentiated bid prices in the model-region and budgetary cost-effectiveness gains of up to 21% in the first auction and up to 36% in the repeated auction. Besides these promising results, some critical aspects as well as lessons to be learned will also be discussed in this paper to improve the design and performance of upcoming conservation auctions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics in its series Working Paper Series in Economics with number 78.
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 04 Mar 2008
Date of revision:
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agri-environmental policy; discriminatory-price auction; multi-unit auction; ecological services; plant biodiversity; experimental economics;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- Q24 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Land
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
- Q57 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Ecological Economics
- R52 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Land Use and Other Regulations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2008-03-15 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2008-03-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENV-2008-03-15 (Environmental Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Baumgärtner, Stefan & Quaas, Martin, 2005.
"The private and public insurance value of conservative biodiversity management,"
UFZ Discussion Papers
27/2005, Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research (UFZ), Division of Social Sciences (ÖKUS).
- Martin F. Quaas & Stefan Baumgärtner, 2006. "The Private and Public Insurance Value of Conservative Biodiversity Management," Working Paper Series in Economics 33, University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics.
- Joachim Wagner & Lena Koller & Claus Schnabel, 2007.
"Sind mittelständische Betriebe der Jobmotor der deutschen Wirtschaft?,"
Working Paper Series in Economics
71, University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics.
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- Wagner, Joachim & Koller, Lena & Schnabel, Claus, 2007. "Sind mittelständische Betriebe der Jobmotor der deutschen Wirtschaft?," Discussion Papers 54, Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Chair of Labour and Regional Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Wagner).
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