The Price of Silence: Markets for Noise Licenses and Airports
AbstractThis paper presents a market design for the management of noise pol- lution created by aircraft tra¢ c around airports. A local market for noise licenses allows noise generators to compensate noise victims. We show that the market allows the market designer to achieve his/her optimal allocation of flights provided that he/she does not over-weight the benefit of economic activity compared to the disutility of noise pollution. The fact that local rep- resentatives of noise victims may be strategic players does not fundamentally alter this finding. Because of the market auctioneer's information constraints, noise licenses are likely to distribute windfall gains to residents, which alter the urban structure in the long run.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Research in Economic Analysis, University of Luxembourg in its series CREA Discussion Paper Series with number 08-08.
Date of creation: 2008
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Other versions of this item:
- Thierry Bréchet & Pierre M. Picard, 2010. "The Price Of Silence: Markets For Noise Licenses And Airports," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 51(4), pages 1097-1125, November.
- BRECHET, Thierry & PICARD, Pierre M., . "The price of silence: markets for noise licenses and airports," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2270, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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