This paper presents a market design for the management of noise pol- lution created by aircraft tra¢ c around airports. A local market for noise licenses allows noise generators to compensate noise victims. We show that the market allows the market designer to achieve his/her optimal allocation of ?ights provided that he/she does not over-weight the bene?t of economic activity compared to the disutility of noise pollution. The fact that local rep- resentatives of noise victims may be strategic players does not fundamentally alter this ?nding. Because of the market auctioneer?s information constraints, noise licenses are likely to distribute windfall gains to residents, which alter the urban structure in the long run.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Center for Research in Economic Analysis, University of Luxembourg in its series CREA Discussion Paper Series with number
08-08.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Elisa Ferreira).
Related research
Keywords:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: