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Sharing the greenhouse: Inducing cooperation in a global common

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  • Damien S Eldridge

    ()
    (Department of Economics and Finance, La Trobe University)

Abstract

Global warming is an example of a global tragedy of the commons. The atmosphere is a global common property resource. The global nature of this resource makes global warming a particularly difficult problem to solve. The reason for this is that there is no world government that can introduce and enforce the standard solutions for common property resource problems in this case. Any solution will need to be voluntary, in the sense that each country must choose to participate in it. This raises the important issue of just how such voluntary cooperation might be obtained. In this paper, we explore the potential for repeated interaction between countries to induce them to cooperate in combating global warming.

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File URL: http://www.latrobe.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/130913/2008.07.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by School of Economics, La Trobe University in its series Working Papers with number 2008.07.

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Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ltr:wpaper:2008.07

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Keywords: Cooperation; Global Warming; Gradual Commitment; Multiple Interaction; Prisoners Dilemma; Repetition; Tragedy of the Commons EDIRC Provider-Institution: RePEc:edi:smlatau;

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  1. Damien S. Eldridge, 2009. "Multiple Interactions and the Management of Local Commons," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 85(270), pages 344-349, 09.
  2. Harry Clarke, 2010. "Strategic issues in global climate change policy ," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 54(2), pages 165-184, 04.
  3. Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2006. "Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195300796, October.
  4. Barrett, Scott, 2005. "The theory of international environmental agreements," Handbook of Environmental Economics, in: K. G. Mäler & J. R. Vincent (ed.), Handbook of Environmental Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 28, pages 1457-1516 Elsevier.
  5. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1990. "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
  6. Long, Ngo Van, 1994. "On Optimal Enclosure and Optimal Timing of Enclosure," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 70(211), pages 368-72, December.
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