A Model of Shareholder Discounts
AbstractMany companies supplying consumption goods and services provide their shareholders with price discounts when they consume them. Although this practice is not uncommon it has not been analysed to date. This paper presents a simple model describing shareholder discounts and consequent market equilibrium, which resembles some features of two-part tariffs. The welfare analysis shows that discounts definitely increase major shareholders' wealth in contrast to the benchmark case of uniform pricing. Their effects on consumers and the whole society are generally ambiguous but certain sufficient conditions ensuring definite conclusions are given. It is also found that the equilibrium outcome of shareholder discount is Pareto inefficient.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School of Economics, La Trobe University in its series Working Papers with number 1999.04.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Market Structure; Shareholders; Industry EDIRC Provider-Institution: RePEc:edi:smlatau;
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- Xiangkang Yin, 2000.
"Two-part tariff competition in duopoly,"
2000.11, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
- Kelton, Christina M.L. & Rebelein, Robert P., 2005.
"A General-Equilibrium Analysis of Public Policy for Pharmaceutical Prices,"
Vassar College Department of Economics Working Paper Series
78, Vassar College Department of Economics.
- Christina M. L. Kelton & Robert P. Rebelein, 2007. "A General-Equilibrium Analysis of Public Policy for Pharmaceutical Prices," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(2), pages 285-318, 04.
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