Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Relations entre les firmes et les actionnaires institutionnels : promotion de l'investissement relationnel

Contents:

Author Info

  • Noura Ben M'barek

    (Laboratoire Orléanais de Gestion)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    L’investissement relationnel est un nouveau mécanisme de contrôle des dirigeants par les investisseurs institutionnels. La pratique de cette forme de contrôle suppose la détention d'une part importante de capital, sur un horizon long et un engagement réciproque entre les investisseurs institutionnels, les administrateurs et les dirigeants sur la politique de la firme et les prises des décisions. L’investissement relationnel est basé sur la construction d’une relation capital / gestion étroite et durable. Il s’exerce surtout au moyen de la négociation. La pratique de l’investissement relationnel permet de réduire l’asymétrie informationnelle, les coûts de transaction et les coûts d’agence. Du côté de l’entreprise, ce mécanisme de contrôle permet de protéger les dirigeants contre les prises de contrôle hostiles et donc d’avoir une vision de long terme sur l’industrie. Toutefois, les investisseurs relationnels peuvent être opportunistes et cherchent de profiter de leurs relations aux dirigeants pour réaliser des gains privés. Enfin, les investisseurs institutionnels peuvent ne pas avoir de l'expertise suffisante pour gérer l'entreprise.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.univ-orleans.fr/log/Doc-Rech/Textes-PDF/2001-5.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Laboratoire Orléanais de Gestion - université d'Orléans in its series Working Papers with number 2001-5.

    as in new window
    Length:
    Date of creation: 2001
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:log:wpaper:2001-5

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: B.P. 6739 - 45067 Orléans Cedex
    Phone: (+33)02 38 41 70 31
    Fax: (+33)02 38 41 73 60
    Web page: http://www.univ-orleans.fr/log/
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: investisseurs institutionnels; investissement relationnel; contrôle; entreprise; relation;

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Lex Donaldson & James H. Davis, 1991. "Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governance and Shareholder Returns," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 16(1), pages 49-64, June.
    2. Aoki, Masahiko, 1990. "Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 28(1), pages 1-27, March.
    3. Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-77, December.
    4. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1985. "Credit Markets and the Control of Capital," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 17(2), pages 133-52, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:log:wpaper:2001-5. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Philippe Paquet).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.