Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Direct vs Indirect Payments for Environmental Services: The Role of Relaxing Market Constraints

Contents:

Author Info

  • Ben Groom

    ()
    (Department of Economics, School of Oriental and African Studies)

  • Charles Palmer

    ()
    (Institute for Environmental Decisions, ETH Zurich)

Abstract

Ferraro and Simpson (2002) argue that when markets are competitive, direct payments for environmental services are more cost effective in achieving environmental goals than indirect payments, say, for capital. However, when eco-entrepreneurs face non-price rationing in input or output markets, as is typical for e.g. credit in developing countries for, we show that interventions which relax constraints can be more cost-effective than direct payments. One corollary of this is that such indirect payments can be preferred to direct payments by interveners (e.g. NGOs) and eco-entrepreneurs alike. Both of these outcomes are more likely when constraints are severe.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.landecon.cam.ac.uk/RePEc/pdf/200836.pdf
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found. If this is indeed the case, please notify (Unai Pascual)
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Cambridge, Department of Land Economics in its series Environmental Economy and Policy Research Working Papers with number 36.2008.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision: 2008
Handle: RePEc:lnd:wpaper:200836

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 19 Silver Street, Cambridge CB3 9EP
Phone: +44 1223 337147
Fax: +44 1223 337130
Web page: http://www.landecon.cam.ac.uk
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Mohammed, Essam, 2011. "Pro-poor benefit distribution in REDD+: Who gets what and why does it matter?," MPRA Paper 43648, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Bush, Glenn & Hanley, Nicholas & Rondeau, Daniel, 2011. "Comparing opportunity cost measures of forest conservation in Uganda; implications for assessing the distributional impacts of forest management approac hes," Stirling Economics Discussion Papers 2011-12, University of Stirling, Division of Economics.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lnd:wpaper:200836. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Unai Pascual).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.