Discretion, Productivity, and Work Satisfaction
AbstractIn Bartling, Fehr and Schmidt (2012) we show theoretically and experimentally that it is optimal to grant discretion to workers if (i) discretion increases productivity, (ii) workers can be screened by past performance, (iii) some workers reciprocate high wages with high effort and (iv) employers pay high wages leaving rents to their workers. In this paper we show experimentally that the productivity increase due to discretion is not only sufficient but also necessary for the optimality of granting discretion to workers. Furthermore, we report representative survey evidence on the impact of discretion on workers’ welfare, confirming that workers earn rents.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Munich, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number 14193.
Date of creation: Jul 2012
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Björn Bartling & Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 2013. "Discretion, Productivity, and Work Satisfaction," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 169(1), pages 4-22, March.
- Bartling, Björn & Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2013. "Discretion, productivity, and work satisfaction," Munich Reprints in Economics 20127, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Bartling, Björn & Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2012. "Discretion, Productivity and Work Satisfaction," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 383, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics
- J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-11-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2012-11-11 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-HRM-2012-11-11 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-LAB-2012-11-11 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-LMA-2012-11-11 (Labor Markets - Supply, Demand, & Wages)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
- Morris M. Kleiner & Richard B. Freeman, 2000. "Who Benefits Most from Employee Involvement: Firms or Workers?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 219-223, May.
- Lea Cassar, 2014. "Optimal contracting with endogenous project mission," ECON - Working Papers 150, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
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